Sorry, body camera. I have read about the Axon brand, the ones that make the Taser. One of the features they also offer is cloud storage of the video, so even if the chief of police personally deleted the video there would be a record somewhere else.
No system is fullproof of course but generally the idea is making it harder to cheat or abuse.
You're missing the fundamental issue. I'm not saying video evidence is easy to delete. When the video is captured, it's just a filename that might have some metadata with officer badge#, officer name, precinct, GPS location, etc. What is not automatically captured is the case number. That gets assigned manually, usually stating out as a report control number.
It's up to someone to enter that data for each video file. Otherwise, the evidence isn't tied to the case, making searching for evidence in any particular case harder.
What's been reported already is Cops are hiding video by inputting a bogus case number. So, when the prosecutor, defense, or whoever might be investigating a complaint against that officer requests that evidence, the relevant video won't be included in a search of the real case number. It would take some effort to locate the relevant footage assuming you know it should have been made available.
None of that is related to the camera brand, features or storage location.
You say no system is perfect, but that's because most systems are designed with the operator in mind ahead of security. The design problem in these types of products revolves around the need to share the data among officers, prosecutors, the police higher-ups, etc.
The worst thing we can do is make the system harder to work with than is absolutely necessary. Once security becomes a burden, people start finding shortcuts and workarounds to make their jobs easier. Think: writing down passwords that are too long and cryptic to remember. That's a major security hole, but so is creating easy-to-pronounce and short-enough-to-remember-(and crack) passwords. Until everyone has an RFID chip embedded in their body somewhere, and all access is granted on a retina scan and RFID verification, no system will be secure AND easy to access for those with authorization.
Keeping a record of each change is relatively minor, but to make it fool proof, you need to cross-reference that with facility entry logs, video cameras for all devices on the network, and so on. Login credentials are too easy to "borrow", and even biometrics fail when someone is careless -- leaving a screen unlocked while they leave their desk for a minute.
Even voice print security has it s limitations.... first 25 seconds .....