Nothing on Baker. And almost nothing on Peruta, other than that it has been relied upon heavily by Judge Scullin in the D.C. Court of Appeals to overturn the D.C. carry ban (Palmer, et. al. v. Washington D.C.). One speculation is that the Ninth Peruta panel is not acting on the Harris intervenor status in order to allow more courts to possibly cite Peruta in other circuits, and thus give it more "weight". Like i said, speculation. But for those who might want to read something peripherally relating to Baker/Peruta and CCW rights...
Washington D.C. enacted a "temporary" CCW licensing law in order to conform with judge Scullin's ruling. You'll never guess, but that new law requires "good reason", which also requires documented proof of that good reason. In other words, no CCW for anyone who wants to carry for self-defense without meeting the other unknown standards. Sound familiar? Of course Palmer, et. al. had sued in order to carry in public for "self defense", which attorney Alan Gura argued, novelly enough, that the right to bear arms (outside the home) is a Constitutionally-guaranteed right. Without the necessity of meeting any "good reason" standard (or any other) erected by our government bureaucrats.
I thought some might like to see some of the quotes from his "Memorandum re Permanent Injunction Request " from October 30, 2014 for it's similarities to Hawaii law (prohibitions against CCW). The whole thing can be downloaded/read here:
http://calguns.net/calgunforum/attachment.php?attachmentid=365704&d=1414888523I've selected some quotes and placed in
bold the most relevant phrases... I hope Gura succeeds and that perhaps this case as it is appealed helps push Peruta (and thus Baker), but I expect the same thing from Hawaii as we see from the D.C. legislators.Note that Gura argues at one point that even those who do not apply and have been rejected have standing to sue if it is known that the process of applying is futile (sound familiar?). So if that is the case all of us who merely want a CCW, even without having applied and been denied, would have standing to sue the state/county/police chief. Woohoo!
Parties often elevate form when they have no substance to discuss, and indeed, very little of
Defendants’ opposition asserts that their new/old licensing regime meets constitutional standards.
Plainly, it does not. Instead, the Court is again treated to a blend of inapposite cases, flat-out error,
and doublespeak. At the root of the problem, Defendants confuse the related concepts of ripeness,
mootness, and standing, and get all three wrong. But perhaps worst of all, Defendants deny the
power of federal courts to enforce compliance with their judgments. p1
Defendants believe that they may instead endlessly erect barriers, pretending that each barrier is a “new law” requiring not only litigation to start from scratch, but administrative exhaustion as well. None of this is correct. p2
When it suited Defendants, the 1932 law was a “longstanding,” “practical ban.” Now it suits
Defendants to present the 1932 regime, copied verbatim in the 2014 law following a five year
absence, as somewhat flexible. In a sense,
Defendants are saying, “this time, trust us,” claiming that
“subsequent interpretation will be informed (and cabined) by relevant Second-Amendment case
law—none of which existed in 1931.” Opp., Dkt. 73, at 11 n.9. “[T]he District will now issue such
licenses, where it did not before.” Id. at 11. But Defendants do not suggest that they will issue
licenses to the Plaintiffs, who obviously cannot meet the Defendants’ new/old standards, so how is it
that Plaintiffs’ injury is resolved?
Plaintiffs did not sue for an administrative adjudication, for the
right to discover the police chief’s opinion of whether they deserve to carry defensive handguns.
That much was never a secret. Plaintiffs sued for a constitutional right. p5
Of course, any suggestion that the individual plaintiffs, and SAF’s membership at-large,
might obtain handgun carry permits based on the constitutional interest in self-defense would be
cynical. Mere days after filing their brief, Defendants released their handgun carry license
application form, which
require the submission of a “good” or “proper” reason under D.C. law,
along with substantiating evidence. See Exh. A, at 3-4; Exh. B, at 4. Plaintiffs lack those attributes,
see infra, so they cannot apply.
Of course, this case has never been about the special privileges of
favored individuals presenting rare circumstances. It is about whether ordinary, law-abiding,
responsible citizens may carry handguns for self-defense. The “new” law does not allow for that. p6
They have merely formalized the process of denial and prohibition by requiring
that which Plaintiffs do not have. If a license were truly now available to Tom Palmer, it would not
have been too much to ask Defendants to
explain exactly how he might obtain one considering his
lack of “good” or “proper” “reason.” p12
Whatever Defendants might pretend about how they would go about policing “good”
and “proper” reasons,
they cannot seriously suggest that they are prepared to issue handgun carry
licenses to people who fail to submit any reason at all for carrying handguns. p14
“One need not apply for a benefit conditioned by a facially unconstitutional law.” United
States v. Baugh, 187 F.3d 1037, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). “The Constitution can
hardly be thought to deny to one subjected to the restraints of [a licensing law] the right to attack its
constitutionality, because he has not yielded to its demands.” Lakewood , 486 U.S. at 756 (quoting
Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 602 (1942) (Stone, C. J., dissenting), adopted per curiam on
rehearing, 319 U.S. 103, 104 (1943)).
“As the ordinance [providing for unbridled licensing
discretion] is void on its face, it was not necessary for appellant to seek a permit under it.” p18
The issue is not whether Defendants are properly interpreting their “good reason”/“proper reason” requirement; the issue is whether that requirement, which on its face precludes Plaintiffs from carrying handguns, is unconstitutional—a decision that Defendant [Washington D.C. police chief] Lanier, unlike a federal court, is not qualified and not authorized to make. p19
A corollary to the rule that one need not submit to a law in order to attack the law as
constitutionally defective is the rule excusing litigants from performing ritualistic and pointless
deeds in order to confirm that they are, in fact, injured by the law.
If circumstances make clear that
an administrative application is hopeless, a plaintiff need not go through the futile act of submitting paperwork. p19
One can readily see why a replacement statute must not “differ[] only in some insignificant
respect” from the enjoined statute.
Today, one needs “good reason” to exercise the right. When that
falls by the wayside, perhaps after another decade of litigation, the application fee would be raised to a million dollars. A decade later, only ambidextrous people can safely carry guns. A decade after that, Olympic medal marksmanship might be demanded. The list of “new laws” is bounded only by Defendants’ imagination. Each time, supposedly, exhaustion and litigation would be required anew, but generations of plaintiffs would [n]ever enjoy a meaningful right. p20
[You can't say Gura doesn't have a sense of humor while reaming them...]