Let me see if I can find the case to illustrate my example. Well I am not sure if I can find the specific instance but here is how it was explained to me about 6 years ago. A group was passing out religious flyers, I think they were Hare Krishnas. The city enacted a law outlawing the hand billing and someone was arrested and charged. The appeal went up and the person passing out flyer was acquitted, who then turned around and tried to sue but was only able to sue the police for violation of his civil rights. I wish I could find the specific case but I am not sure if I know which one it is at this point. The point was made that police are expected to know that you cannot arrest someone for a 1st amendment right even if the law said to and only they (police department) were liable. In truth this type of instance is not that common. Most cases of laws that have some flaws don't involve something as obvious or as serious as violating someone's constitutional rights.
However police are definitely not always immune just because they are doing their job in good faith. Some laws like good Samaritan laws do however protect police. Domestic violence laws here in Hawaii protect police officers from false arrest as long as they are doing their job in good faith because the law requires officers to arrest in certain situations, it actually takes away any discretion.
Qualified immunity does offer some protection but it is not a trump card, there is that clause of "reasonableness"
Please do. You state that an officer was "sued" but that lends little to your argument as anyone at anytime can be sued for anything. It is not the fact that you are sued, it is the fact that you did not have a judgement entered against you that really matters. I can sue you for painting you house green, but I would never prevail in court.
Here's the basic doctrine:
A public official performing a discretionary function enjoys qualified immunity in a civil
action for damages, provided his or her conduct does not violate clearly established federal statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The immunity is "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability."
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
Furthermore, an officer acting on advice of, in accordance with a superior or attorney is futher insulated from civil actions:
...the fact of the consultation and the purport of the advice obtained should be factored into the totality of the circumstances and considered in determining the officer's entitlement to qualified immunity. Whether advice obtained from a prosecutor prior to making an arrest fits into the totality of circumstances that appropriately inform the qualified immunity determination is a question of first impression in this circuit. In Suboh v. Dist. Atty's Office of Suffolk Dist., 298 F.3d 81 (1st Cir.2002), we noted the question but had no occasion to answer it. See id. at 97. In dictum, we implied that if an officer seeks counsel from a prosecutor anent the legality of an intended action and furnishes the latter the known information material to that decision, the officer's reliance on emergent advice might be relevant, for qualified immunity purposes, to the reasonableness of his later conduct. . .Other courts, however, have spoken authoritatively to the issue. [collecting circuit cases] . . . .We agree with our sister circuits and with the implication of the Suboh dictum that there is some room in the qualified immunity calculus for considering both the fact of a pre-arrest consultation and the purport of the advice received. As a matter of practice, the incorporation of these factors into the totality of the circumstances is consistent with an inquiry into the objective legal reasonableness of an officer's belief that probable cause supported an arrest. It stands to reason that if an officer makes a full presentation of the known facts to a competent prosecutor and receives a green light, the officer would have stronger reason to believe that probable cause existed. And as a matter of policy, it
makes eminently good sense, when time and circumstances permit, to encourage officers to obtain an informed opinion before charging ahead and making an arrest in uncertain circumstances. . . .
In the instance you cite (handing out flyers) the officer was probably convicted because he knew, or should have known, that such activities were Constutionally protected. That is where the "qualified" comes into play.
We caution, however, that the mere fact that an officer secures a favorable pre-arrest opinion from a friendly prosecutor does not automatically guarantee that qualified immunity will follow. Rather, that consultation comprises only one factor, among many, that enters into the totality of the circumstances relevant to the qualified immunity analysis. . . The primary focus continues to be the evidence about the suspect and the suspected crime that is within the officer's ken. In considering the relevance of an officer's pre-arrest consultation with a prosecutor, a reviewing court must determine whether the officer's reliance on the prosecutor's advice was objectively reasonable. . . Reliance would not satisfy this standard if an objectively reasonable officer would have cause to believe that the prosecutor's advice was flawed, off point, or otherwise untrustworthy. . . Law enforcement officers have an independent duty to exercise their professional judgment and can be brought to book for objectively
unreasonable mistakes regardless of whether another government official (say, a prosecutor or a magistrate) happens to compound the error. . .
In the vast majority of cases where officers use the Qualified Immunity defense, they are successful. That is not to say that all actions of the police are protected. As you say, there is a "reasonablness" standard, as well as other issues to be considered.
Cited material from:
SECTION 1983: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Karen M. Blum (kblum@suffolk.edu)
Suffolk University Law School
Research Date: February 1, 2006
http://www.njd.uscourts.gov/atty/3dCirqual06.pdf