SCOTUS rules stun guns are Constitutionally protected "arms". Well, at least they ruled that Massachussetts' Supreme Court ruling that an upheld conviction for possessing and using one is in error and must be reheard under the SCOTUS guidance that stun guns are "protected" as "arms" by the Constitution via Heller and McDonald. SCOTUS shreds the absurd arguments offered by the government to support the ban and conviction and upheld by the state supreme court, and points out the simplicity of understanding that Heller and McDonald say the exact opposite as the reasoning of the state courts.
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/032116zor_h3ci.pdfThe order is at page 15, and an extensive further "concurrence" analysis by Justice Alito (joined by Justice Thomas) follows. Good stuff for us. The Young case in Hawaii already challenges all the
bullshit bans on various knives and stun guns and batons and "short barrelled" rifles and shotguns, etc. that Hawaii legislators have so unconstitutionally made criminals of us who might want to possess or carry such items for self-defense, so this will be at least a footnote added to the briefs for if/when Young ever does get before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Here's a sample from the actual order:
The Court has held that “the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at the time of the founding,” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, 582 (2008), and that this “Second Amendment right is fully applicable to the States,” McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, 750 (2010). In this case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld a Massachusetts law prohibiting the possession of stun guns after examining “whether a stun gun is the type of weapon contemplated by Congress in 1789 as being protected by the Second Amendment.” 470 Mass. 774, 777, 26 N. E. 3d 688, 691 (2015).
The court offered three explanations to support its holding that the Second Amendment does not extend to stun guns. First, the court explained that stun guns are not protected because they “were not in common use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment.” Id., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693. This is inconsistent with Heller’s clear statement that the Second Amendment “extends . . . to . . . arms . . . that were not in existence at the time of the founding.” 554 U. S., at 582.
The court next asked whether stun guns are “dangerous per se at common law and unusual,” 470 Mass., at 781, 26 N.E. 3d, at 694, in an attempt to apply one “important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms,"Heller, 554 U. S., at 627; see ibid. (referring to “the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual weapons’”). In so doing, the court concluded that stun guns are “unusual” because they are “a thoroughly modern invention.” 470 Mass., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 693–694. By equating “unusual” with “in common use at the time of the Second Amendment’s enactment,” the court’s second explanation is the same as the first; it is inconsistent with Heller for the same reason.
Finally, the court used “a contemporary lens” and found “nothing in the record to suggest that [stun guns] are readily adaptable to use in the military.” 470 Mass., at 781, 26 N. E. 3d, at 694. But Heller rejected the proposition “that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected.” 554 U. S., at 624–625.
For these three reasons, the explanation the Massachusetts court offered for upholding the law contradicts this Court’s precedent. Consequently, the petition for a writ of certiorari and the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The judgment of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.