Case: State of Hawaii v. Raymond Heapy, 151 P.3d 764 (2007)
Procedural Facts: On August 4th, 2004 Defendant Heapy was charged with a violation of Haw. Rev. Stat. § 291E-61. Defendant went to trial, and soon after on August 11th, 2004, filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence; during February 2005, the Court denied the motion to suppress. Following the hearing on June 7th, 2005, the court came forth with its written Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and written order denying the motion. Heapy then filed a Notice of Appeal.
Facts: On June 16th, 2004 Maui Police Department was operating an intoxication check point on a state owned road. Officer Correa was assigned as a “chase car.” Officer Correa on at least 40 separate occasions stopped persons for ‘evading’ a checkpoint. Numerous of these individuals were found not to be intoxicated, but were delinquent on insurance, registration, or safety inspections. Heapy was operating a motor vehicle heading towards an intoxication checkpoint, where Correa was assigned. Heapy turned onto a road prior to the beginning of the checkpoint. Correa began to follow and pursue Heapy on a dead end road. After Heapy passed the only structure on the road, Correa initiated a traffic stop. No infractions were noted. Heapy was not driving erratic or reckless.
Issue: Was the district court wrong in denying Heapy’s Motion to Suppress Evidence to suppress all evidence obtained during the traffic stop?
Holding: Justices voted four to one in favor of Heapy ruling that the District Court erred in denying Heapy’s motion to suppress “all evidence and statements obtained as a result of the police stop,” because the stop was in violation of the Hawai‘i constitution, Article I, Section 7.
Majority Reasoning: Officer Correa lacked the “specific and articulable facts,” to justify the stop. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1968. Furthermore, outside of Mr. Heady “avoiding the checkpoint,” which was not an offense to begin with, Correa had no belief or reason to believe that Heapy was engaged in, or about to be engaged in, some form of criminal activity. See United States v. Cortez et. al., 449 U.S. at 417. And, because the traffic stop lacks the above facts, the stop was unlawful and the evidence must be suppressed.
A. Rule: Stopping authority must have “articulable” suspicion that a “crime has been committed or is about to be committed” for the stop to be lawful.
B. Application: Officer Correa’s stop of Mr. Heady was unlawful and in violation of Heapy’s civil rights; the stop was unlawful and the evidence must be suppressed.
Concurring Opinion(s) Reasoning:
Dissenting Opinion(s) Reasoning: Justice Moon believes the majority was wrong incorrect in dismissing an officers experience in determining whether a stop should happen or not; that a person intentionally turning away from a checkpoint is “reasonable” suspicion of committing the crime of “turning away a from a intoxication checkpoint” regardless of the circumstances; and, that allowing people to turn around would prevent the checkpoints from furthering the States interest in reducing drunk driving.
Implications on Investigations:
Heapy ensures and will require officers to properly annotate and articulate the probable cause for a stop. It prevents officers from pulling someone over just because they “turned away” from an intoxication checkpoint or other road block. This will require officers to patrol and utilize greater observational skills and abilities to identify potential intoxicated drivers. Heapy also revoked the officer’s ability to utilize hunches (also known as “experience”) for the purpose of a stop.